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Note to schmooze participants: Some of you have already submitted tickets that are the
equivalent of box seats behind home plate at Yankee Stadium during the World Series.
My ticket is worth a bit less; it’s more like a bleacher seat at a Tigers-Padres game, on a
Wednesday afternoon, the fifth week of the season. Needless to say, please do not cite or
circulate without permission.
In my work lately I have been considering whether we can get a better perspective
on constitutional development and Supreme Court decision making by placing the Court
and its policies/doctrines/interpretations in the larger context of “regime politics.” I have
no technical definition of regime politics; I am just referring to the various ways in which
governing coalitions organize their power and advance their political agenda within a
system of institutions. Within the political science literature I am using Dahl and
Shapiro’s work as points of departure, and the “new institutionalism” literature (discussed
by Kersch in his ticket) as a template.
From the point of view of governing coalitions, courts can be seen as similar to
executive branch agencies. What these institutions have in common is that they are
staffed by politically-appointed office holders who have policy-making responsibilities
over issues that are of interest to party leaders and their constituents. This means that
there is a routine and ongoing interest in shaping the “decision-making bias” of these
institutions. The main differences between these institutions are that courts (a) have
much more political insulation (and thus decision-making independence) and (b) have
much broader policy-making jurisdiction. Of course, courts and agencies also generate
different internal institutional norms that may impose different constraints or institutional
viewpoints upon officeholders.
What can be done with this starting point? In some recent essays I have tried to
examine certain periods in American constitutional development that are best understood
as the by-product of “partisan entrenchment,” that is, an effort on the part of the President
and Senate leaders to protect a potentially vulnerable political agenda by shaping the
decision-making bias of the federal judiciary (and especially the Supreme Court). The
two case studies I have looked at so far relate to the post-Reconstruction efforts of the
Republican Party to promote an agenda of conservative economic nationalism, and the
efforts of Democratic leaders in the 1960s to reshape the federal judiciary so that it

reflected the values of the Great Society. The point would be to see whether certain
developments in constitutional law can be traced, not just to the individual policy
preferences of judges, but to the agendas of political parties.
In other words, when we think about the Lochner era, it may be more useful to
think a little less about the specific jurisprudence and life histories of the individual
justices and more about the attitudes of the post-Reconstruction Republican Party about
how courts fit into their general agenda. This echoes Powe’s point that the Warren Court
is better seen as politically constructed to be a functioning partner in the promotion of the
Great Society rather than as a creature of judicial whimsy. All of this is linked to other
work that people around the table are doing on what might be called “the political
construction of judicial power.”
This effort to tie developments in constitutional law to politics outside the Court
works best when one can show that governing coalitions have an interest in a specific
area of constitutional decision making. There is good evidence that post-Reconstruction
Republicans cared about the treatment received by national corporations in the judiciary
(after all, they changed the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction it possible to remove cases
from state courts into the federal courts) and about the larger legal-constitutional context
for the development of a national industrial economy. There is good evidence that
Johnson cared about having the courts there to protect/promote a civil rights agenda.
On the other hand, courts have very broad policy-making jurisdiction, and so it is
inevitable that judges will be addressing issues that were of very low salience to the
policy-conscious party leaders who selected them. When this happens, how accurate is it
to attribute the constitutional decision making to partisan entrenchment, or to some other
extra-judicial feature of regime politics?
Constitutional law governing free speech may be a useful focal point for this
question. There is little evidence that Supreme Court appointments in the twentieth
century have been driven specifically by a governing coalition’s interest in advancing a
certain understanding of free speech doctrine. Still, at various times in the 20th century,
the nature of free speech doctrine has been an important matter for important political
constituencies associated with governing coalitions. As Kersch points out in his
schmooze ticket, free speech law had important implications for the labor movement
during the New Deal and for the civil rights movement in the years leading up to the
Great Society, and there is good reason to think that “the shape of free speech law
commonly reflects substantive regime commitments, expanding in certain areas and
being trimmed in others.”
At a time when national party leaders had no real interest in extending special
national protections to non-economic personal liberties, and when national elites of both
parties favored corporate rights and were hostile to labor demands, it is no surprise that
Supreme Court justices (chosen largely because they were reliable economic
conservatives) would articulate first amendment principles that were hostile to labor
marches, pickets, or boycotts. By 1938 there was a different political context, and
national political elites were more committed to accommodating labor interest,
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constitutional doctrine was being modified to incorporate labor picketing as qualifying
for federal constitutional protection. Among other things this enabled the national
government to supervise the treatment afforded to union organizers by local officials such
as Mayor Frank “I Am Law” Hague, who was notorious in using municipal permit
ordinances against labor.
However, it may be a mistake to interpret the Court’s decision in Hague v. CIO
(1939) in terms of an effort on the part of New Deal Democrats to fortify Roosevelt’s
political agenda and serve the interests of a prominent constituency of the Democratic
Party. (As you know, Kersch does not make this claim.) Three of the justices in the
majority—Stone, Hughes, and Roberts—were appointed by Republican presidents; they
were joined by FDR’s first two appointments, Black and Reed (over the dissents of the
vestiges of the old guard, McReynolds and Butler). Rather than tie the decision to a party
coalition it would be more appropriate (as Kersch notes) to look back to the passage of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in March of 1932, passed by a Republican Congress during the
last year of the Hoover presidency. The Act barred the federal courts from issuing
injunctions against peaceful strikes, boycotts (including secondary boycotts), and
picketing (including peaceful mass picketing) in labor disputes. Thus, Hoover
Republicans (like Hughes and Roberts) were the ones who were willing to associate
themselves to the proposition that “it is necessary that he [the worker] have full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing,
to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” By 1939 a bipartisan coalition of justices was willing to transfer this agreed-upon principle into the
domain of constitutional policy making. (One might even call Norris-LaGuardia an act
of coordinate construction, since many unionists believed that the act merely recognized
and protected worker rights that were already guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.) Thus, rather than view this development as an example of partisan
entrenchment, it would be more accurate to see the Court reflecting a bi-partisan regime
consensus in national politics over the wisdom of granting workers protections for their
expressive activities. By the time Thornhill v. Alabama was handed down a year later
this regime-consensus was extended to make it clear that picketing could be curtailed if
labor activism threatened production. (As Kersch notes, the Court would eventually
adopt a similar approach to employer speech, distinguishing coercive from non-coercive
expressions.)
So perhaps the constitutional law of free speech is sometimes best understood as
serving partisan agendas and sometimes serving broader regime agendas—with the
caveat that “broader regime agendas” may just be another way of characterizing a
fortuitous bi-partisan consensus among national elites.
How far can we push this approach? There should be very little controversy in
explaining the Warren Court’s 1960s free speech/free press jurisprudence with reference
to the sympathies of moderate Republicans and northern Democrats to the civil rights
movement, which was utterly dependant on broad protections for expressive activity for
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the success of its political tactics. Moreover, as Powe’s history of the Warren Court
makes it clear, the justices began to sour on demonstrations after urban rioting. (As he
put it, “Cox and Brown, while reversing convictions, indicated that the era of seeing
demonstrations as pristine exercises of First Amendment rights had passed. It was now
the era of mobs and anarchy. Whether one looked to Berkeley or to Watts or to the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in the South, there seemed unfortunate
confirmation.”) The continuing splits on the Court (in cases like Adderley) mirrored
developing splits among national elites about whether civil rights demonstrators were
getting “out of control” and “sowing the seeds” of urban riots or whether they were
simply pushing their legitimate agenda; Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White
reflected the position of more moderate national leaders (and, for that matter, the results
of the “law and order” midterm elections in 1966, where Republicans gained 47 House
seats and 3 Senate seats) while Warren, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas continued to align
themselves with King and company. U.S. v. O’Brien (a 7-1 decision) came down less
than two months after the riots following the assassination of King (with Powe adding
that “while students at Columbia University were ‘liberating’ the president’s office—by
occupying it and trashing it—and closing down the university”).
Is it possible to place the Court’s obscenity decisions from the 1960s within this
“regime politics” rubric? On the one hand it seems clear that the Court was not a partner
with national party leaders in moving toward a liberalization of obscenity law; the Court
did not receive the same public support from elected officials on its obscenity decisions
that it did for its civil rights decision making. On the other hand, national opinion on
obscenity was certainly changing in the late 1950s and 1960s, with moderates in both
parties becoming uncomfortable with local prosecutions against material that they
considered protected by the first amendment (mostly Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Tropic of
Cancer, and Fanny Hill). Both Powe and Klarman would view this as an example of
elite national opinion sometimes being at odds with regional practices that were
increasingly viewed as “outlier” positions. The split on the Court probably mirrored the
sense of national elites on the best course of action: justices such as Brennan and Stewart
felt it was appropriate to extend some federal protection by nationalizing the criteria for
what counted as obscene, while Harlan and Warren believed it best to let the states handle
these sorts of traditional “vices.” There may have been a more robust national debate
about the problem except that elected officials felt constrained about embracing the
liberalizing position. Thus, as Powe reports, when a President’s Commission on
Obscenity recommended in 1970 that laws should reflect a consenting-adults position, the
Senate immediately voted 60-5 (“with the normal liberals nowhere to be found”) to reject
the report.
Thus, as an example of “regime politics,” the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence
may be best understood as an example of Graber’s point about how courts (like
independent regulatory commissions) are sometimes valuable to a regime to the extent
that they can address issues that present political challenges for elected officials.
I suppose would be easy enough to extend this approach to an understanding of
the Court’s jurisprudence on campaign finance, hate crime legislation, unlawful
advocacy, protection for “subversives,” regulation of the airwaves, abortion protestors,
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commercial speech, the establishment and free exercise clauses, and so on. In each case
we could locate the justices’ “policy” views on free speech within the prevailing range of
views that existed among contemporaneous national policy makers. The justices and
their law clerks may come up with their own technical-legal justifications for why a
particular policy is appropriate, but (on this view) these justifications are no more the
explanation of the policy then (for example) are the justifications offered by the staff of
the new Republican dominated Environmental Protection Agency in support of new
approaches for assessing whether industries are in compliance with air pollution
standards.
And so I end with a set of related questions rather than a proved hypothesis:
What would be the evidence for the proposition that free speech doctrine, as
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, is anything other than a highly stylized translation
of the conventional political preferences of national elites? To what extent are splits on
the Court best understood as technical-theoretical disagreements within first amendment
jurisprudence, and to what extent are they merely a reproduction of familiar
disagreements among conventional policy makers? If we acknowledge that the
development of the constitutional law of the first amendment is always forged within the
parameters established by American political development (and by the preferences of
members of the national governing coalition), then what precisely is the relationship
between the academic practice of first amendment theory and the first amendment policy
making of the U.S. Supreme Court? Or, to put the point in a more constructive light,
what is the best way to reconcile political science accounts of constitutional lawmaking
with the traditional normative-theoretical practices of the law professorate?
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